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In real life, punishment is often implemented only insofar as punishers are entitled to punish and punishees 
deserve to be punished. We provide an experimental test for this principle of legitimacy in the framework 
of a public goods game, by comparing it with a classic (unrestricted) punishment institution. A significant 
advantage of our institution is that it rules out antisocial punishment, a phenomenon which recent studies 
document to play a key role in undermining the scope for self-governance. Our findings show that, despite 
the lack of additional monetary incentives to cooperate, the introduction of legitimate punishment leads to 
substantial efficiency gains, in terms of both cooperation and earnings. Therefore, in businesses and other 
organizations,  this  device  could  successfully  deal  with  the  principal-agent  problem,  with  the  principal 
delegating a task to a team of agents. Further, we interestingly find that removing the information over 
high contributors’ choices only leads to a dramatic decline in cooperation rates and earnings. This result 
implies  that  providing  feedback  over  virtuous  behavior  is  necessary  to  make  an  institution  based  on 
legitimate punishment effective.                       
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 1. Introduction 
In naturally occurring environments, punishment is a widespread phenomenon. A typical 
feature of sanctioning mechanisms, both within formal and informal institutions, is that their usage 
is far from being arbitrary and unrestricted. Everyday life abounds in examples where specific 
requirements have to be met in order for a person or an institution to be viewed as a potential 
punisher as well as a potential punishee. In many countries, you need to have a clear criminal record 
to apply for jobs such as police officer or judge, where you will need to sanction others on a daily 
basis.  Even  the  authority  of  figures  like  school  teachers  and  parents  might  be  at  risk  if  they 
misbehave or if their behaviour is not in line with what they are trying to teach to their students and 
kids. Elected politicians will act as lawmakers, but if, say, a member of parliament known for his 
tough anti-drugs or anti-prostitution campaigns gets caught at a party with cocaine or escorts, in 
many countries the media will easily induce him to resign. At the international level, in the current 
political debate on the hot topic of nuclear weapons development, a forcefully repeated claim is that 
while democratic countries (e.g. Israel) are entitled to produce nuclear weapons, non-democratic 
regimes  (e.g.  Iran  and  North  Korea)  are  not.  What  these  otherwise  distant  situations  where 
punishment is at work have in common is an underlying principle of legitimacy: only some people 
or institutions have the right to sanction (‘entitlement’) and not everyone deserves to be sanctioned 
(‘desert’). In modern societies, punishment is usually viewed as socially and ethically acceptable 
only insofar as a principle of legitimacy holds. Centuries of normative argument in applied ethics, 
philosophy of law and political philosophy (with classical contributions from prominent thinkers 
such as John Stuart Mill and, more recently, John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas and Ronald Dworkin, 
among many others) have convincingly made clear that in a liberal democracy punishment needs to 
be legitimate, in order to be theoretically justified
1. Also in his influential classical paper on crime 
and punishment, Becker (1968) takes for granted that punishment must be legitimate in order to be 
allowed. In this article, we investigate this legitimacy-punishment nexus experimentally within a 
public goods game framework and find that legitimate punishment turns out to be an effective 
institution in both enforcing cooperation and raising individual earnings. We also focus on the role 
of information and show that restrictions on punishment activity are effective only when feedback 
over how the most deserving individuals do actually behave is provided. On the whole, then, our 
results interestingly suggest that it is the interaction between the legitimate nature of the sanctioning 
institution at work and the amount of information over peers’ contribution behavior provided to the 
                                                 
1 On philosophical grounds it can be plausibly maintained that the very existence of the modern state itself rests upon a  
fundamental legitimacy argument: in a democracy, citizens delegate the power to the state and, due to its being the  
legitimate representative of the people, the government has access to coercive power. Within their geographical  
boundaries, states are sovereign and allowed to sanction citizens adopting wrongful behavior right because society as a 
whole conferred to them the legitimacy to do so. subjects that plays a critical role in determining final contribution and earning levels. The remainder 
of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  section  2  briefly  reviews  the  related  literature;  section  3 
illustrates the experimental design; section 4 reports our main results and section 5 discusses our 
findings and concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Related literature 
In a public goods game or voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), there is a group of 
subjects who, as the game starts, receive an individual monetary endowment, from which they may 
contribute any amount to a public good that returns a payoff to each of them. The structure of 
monetary payoffs in the VCM  makes it a classical ‘social dilemma’, as each agent has a dominant 
strategy to free ride, while, in contrast, at the social optimum each individual contributes his entire 
endowment. Therefore, the straightforward prediction based on so called Homo Oeconomicus is 
that everyone should free ride, both in the one-shot and in the finitely repeated game. However, in 
the finitely repeated version of this game, the following pattern typically occurs: initially, average 
contributions  are  relatively  high,  whereas,  as  the  game  unfolds,  they  gradually  decline  and 
cooperation converges to a near-negligible level (Ledyard, 1995).  
  In the last years, an increasing number of VCM experiments have been investigating the role 
that institutions can play in the enforcement of cooperation. While a strand of experimental research 
deals with endogenously formed institutions (see e.g. Gürerk et al., Kosfeld et al., 2009 and Sutter 
et  al.,  2010),  a  second  strand  encompasses  exogenously  imposed  institutions.  Within  the  latter 
research  area,  some  studies  focused  on  centralized  mechanisms  (see  Chen  and  Plott,  1996; 
Falkinger  et  al.,  2000;  Andreoni,  1993;  and  Chan  et  al.,  2002),  whereas  others  explored 
decentralized institutions (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 2002; Casari and Plott, 
2003;  Rand  et  al.,  2009;  Fudenberg  and  Pathak,  2010).  In  their  pathbreaking  study,  Fehr  and 
Gächter  (2000;  2002)  demonstrate  that  while  in  non-punishment  treatments  (VCM  without 
punishment opportunities) cooperation rates indeed tend to fall over time (round after round), this 
‘decay phenomenon’ does not occur insofar as players are allowed to incur a cost to decrease 
others’  monetary  payoffs  (VCM  with  punishment  opportunities).  The  presence  of  punishment 
opportunities  turned  out  to  make  the  difference  and  made  cooperation  sustainable  over  time
2. 
Insofar  as  we  suppose  that  in  the  laboratory  subjects  act  selfishly  in  order  to  systematically 
maximize  their  monetary  gains,  costly  punishment  is  a  puzzle.  In  other  words,  this  behavioral 
assumption predicts that, in a finitely repeated VCM with punishment options, subjects will not use 
                                                 
2 Analogously, the introduction of explicit punishment and/or rewarding opportunities significantly affects subjects’ 
behavioral choices in the experimental games studied by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Fehr and Rockenbach (2003).  such  options,  due  to  the  net  monetary  costs  associated  with  their  usage
3.  By  contrast,  peer 
punishment of free riders turned out to be a widespread phenomenon both in the field and in the lab, 
where it occurred both with anonymous random matching (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 2002; Egas and 
Riedl,  2008;  Anderson  and  Putterman,  2006;  Rockenbach  and  Milinski,  2006)  and  with  fixed 
groups playing a finite number of times (Yamagishi, 1986; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Page et al., 
2005; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). Experimentally, it has been shown to represent a powerful 
enforcement device, through which it is possible to induce and successfully sustain cooperation in 
social dilemmas.  
Like these studies, in this contribution we focus on a decentralized mechanism based on 
exogenously determined sanctioning opportunities. However, unlike the papers cited above, but 
consistently  with  the  considerations  developed  in  the  introductory  section,  we  suitably  restrict 
access to punishment options: our institutional arrangement is based on ‘legitimate punishment’ in 
the sense that it prescribes that only relatively high contributors can sanction and only relatively low 
contributors can be sanctioned. While some of the previously cited papers focus on institutions 
which derive their legitimacy from a process of endogenous choice, we analyze an enforcement 
device which is exogenously imposed but at the same time legitimate due to its inner, structural 
features,  i.e.  due  to  its  conditioning  the  possibility  to  punish  on  the  adoption  of  cooperative 
behavior  in  the  first  place.  By  focusing  on  restricted  punishment,  we  depart  from  most  of  the 
existing  experimental  literature  on  punishment,  as  lab  studies  on  sanctioning  mechanisms  have 
mainly  focused  on  unrestricted  punishment.  In  a  public  goods  game  environment,  unrestricted 
punishment seems to work extremely well, under certain conditions. Fehr and Gächter’s (2000) 
well-known findings represent a very important ‘spontaneous order’ result: subjects are willing to 
sanction others even if this is costly and such an institution is effective in enhancing cooperation 
and  preventing  the  unpleasant  ‘decay  phenomenon’  occurring  when  punishment  options  are 
unavailable.  However,  recent  work  convincingly  reveals  that  there  is  also  a  ‘dark  side’  of 
unrestricted punishment. In particular, the following important four drawbacks have been identified 
in the last years: (1) the quantitative relevance of antisocial punishment; (2) the lack of robustness 
to institutional changes; (3) the risk of motivation crowding-out and (4) the low level of average 
earnings.  Let  us  shortly  illustrate  each  of  these  downsides  of  unrestricted  punishment.  First, 
unrestricted punishment in many cases significantly undermines the scope for self-governance, as, 
since  everyone  is  free  to  punish  everyone  else,  sanctioning  may  take  the  form  of  misdirected, 
‘antisocial’ punishment – that is, low contributors punishing high contributors. Recent evidence 
indicates that antisocial punishment substantially reduces contribution rates (Cyniabuguma et al., 
                                                 
3 Sethi and Somanathan (1996) observe, on the basis of the case studies cited in their work, that punishments such as 
social disapproval and physical damage are costly not only for the punishee, but also for the punisher. 2006)  –  especially  if  it  is  targeted  at  outgroup  members  when  competition  between  groups  is 
created (Goette et al., 2010) or it occurs within less industrialized societies (Herrmann et al., 2008) 
–, to the point that cooperation in the presence of punishment can be even lower than in its absence 
(Gächter and Herrmann, 2010). As Gächter and Herrmann (2010) correctly point out, “Punishment 
of cooperators has been largely neglected in previous research on social preferences because it was 
negligible compared to the punishment of free riders. Our results show that this neglect is not 
warranted  because  punishment  of  cooperators  can  be  very  significant  in  some  subject  pools”. 
Second, when multiple stages of punishment are allowed, counterpunishment and feuds are likely to 
be triggered, limiting, once again, successful self-governance and leading, eventually, to a demise 
of  cooperation  (Nikiforakis,  2008  and  Nikiforakis  and  Engelmann,  forthcoming).  Since  the 
opportunity to retaliate punishments exists in many real-life decentralized interactions (Nikiforakis, 
2008),  these  negative  results  show  that  unrestricted  punishment  is  not  robust,  as  an  effective 
cooperation enforcement device, to minimal institutional changes. Third, a further problem is that 
since  this  form  of  punishment  exclusively  relies  on  deterrence,  that  is  on  extrinsic  motives  to 
cooperate, the risk is either not to elicit people’s intrinsic motivations to comply or even to crowd 
them out, especially when incentives are weak
4. Fourth, another crucial point to be made is that 
solving the free rider problem and achieving a significant level of cooperation is only one part of 
the problem as a whole. In particular, recent papers indicate that, even in the presence of a single 
stage of sanctioning, the success of unrestricted punishment in enforcing cooperation comes at a 
substantial cost. Botelho et al. (2005) analyzed Fehr and Gächter’s (2000; 2002) data and find lower 
earnings when punishment was allowed than under no punishment (see also Cyniabuguma et al., 
2006 for similar results on this and other sanctioning experiments). The same occurs to average 
payoffs in 13 out of 16 participant pools of Herrmann et al.’s (2008) experiment on antisocial 
punishment cited above. Similarly, Dreber et al. (2008) show that when in a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma players can choose between cooperation, defection and costly punishment, average group 
payoffs are not higher than when the punishment option is not available. Further, since punishing is 
costly not only for the punishees but also for the punishers, the ‘winners’ (i.e. those who get the 
highest earnings) in their experiment are the individuals who abstain from punishing. This evidence 
indicates that unrestricted punishment is a double-edged sword (Goette et al., 2010), as it raises 
cooperation levels but, unless we consider a significantly longer time horizon (Gächter et al., 2008), 
leads to average earnings which are lower than in the absence of sanctioning opportunities. From an 
economic perspective, this is a serious shortcoming of unrestricted punishment, showing that this 
                                                 
4 Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) provide experimental evidence that sanctions underlying selfish or greedy intentions – 
unlike sanctions perceived as fair – produce extremely negative effects on cooperation.    form  of  sanctioning  risks  to  determine  efficiency  losses  and,  therefore,  to  turn  into  a  wasteful 
activity for those societies or organizations that adopted it.  
On  the  whole,  these  arguments  strongly  question  the  belief  that  individuals  are  able  to 
successfully govern themselves through punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008). A natural solution seems 
then to rely on an exogenous, central authority, by assigning to a Hobbesian Leviathan the power to 
sanction non-cooperators. However, monitoring the individuals can be extremely costly and an 
important implication to be drawn from this paper that this needs not be the case, as solving the 
above  drawback  does  not  automatically  imply  passing  from  decentralized  to  centralized 
punishment. Decentralized punishment can be successful. The key condition for this to occur is that 
it needs to be suitably restricted, along the lines described above. In particular, one reason why we 
decided to investigate  legitimate punishment is that we expected such an institution not to suffer 
from the limitations which the recent studies cited above have found with regard to unrestricted 
punishment. While with unrestricted punishment various forms of undesirable behaviors often occur 
and lead, over time, to a breakdown of cooperation, a punishment institution based on a principle of 
legitimacy rules out detrimental forms of sanctioning – such as (first-order) antisocial punishment 
and, when multiple stages of punishment are allowed, feuds, counterpunishment and higher-order 
perverse punishment – by construction. On positive grounds, it was also plausible to expect that 
such a principle of legitimacy may elicit people’s intrinsic motivation to contribute and punish low 
contributors.  Moreover,  in  the  light  of  these  considerations,  we  also  wondered  whether  under 
legitimate punishment aggregate earnings could be higher than under unrestricted punishment
5.  
It is reasonable to believe that in this context the impact of punishment on cooperation could 
also depend on the amount of information about others’ behavior, a variable which has been almost 
completely neglected in the punishment literature
6, and which could have a significant influence on 
the perception of the legitimacy of the sanction. We believe that within an environment in which the 
right to punish is awarded on a meritocratic basis, feedback over how the most virtuous members of 
the group behave might play an important two-fold role in promoting cooperation. First, when this 
information is provided, a member who has been punished is not only aware of the fact that her 
contribution to the public good is lower than the contribution of the member who has punished her, 
but she also knows the exact level of contributions of those who have gained the right to punish. In 
this sense, the provision of information on the most virtuous members’ choices contributes to shed 
                                                 
5 Related papers where punishment is not unrestricted include Ertan et al. (2009), Xiao and Kunreuther (2010) and 
Casari and Luini (2009). In the latter, the authors allow punishment only insofar as it is requested by a coalition of at 
least two subjects. 
6 For exceptions, see Nikiforakis (2010), Xiao and Houser (2010), and Grechenig et al. (2010). As Nikiforakis (2010)  
points out, institutional details such as the format in which feedback about the actions of others is given can affect the  
efficacy of peer punishment in promoting cooperation. light on the degree of legitimization of the punishment activity. Second, this kind of feedback could 
also serve a pure cognitive function, as an individual who knows how the virtuous members of her 
group behave also knows what she must do to avoid punishment in the next future and what is the 
level of contributions expected by the other group members. 
In  our  study,  we  address  this  problem  by  comparing  the  case  in  which  subjects  have 
information on every other member’s contributions with the case in which each member is informed 
only about the average contribution of her group and on the contribution of the members who have 
contributed less than herself. In the latter case, members whose contribution is not the highest do 
not know what is the highest level of contribution in their group. 
 
3. Experimental setup 
In our sanctioning institution, some key restrictions are exogenously imposed with regard to 
both who is allowed to punish and whom punishers can punish
7. These assumptions are in line with 
what  happens  within  several  naturally  occurring  environments  like  the  ones  recalled  in  the 
introduction, where it is often the case that the social acceptance of punishment is conditional on (i) 
the punisher being entitled to punish (entitlement) and (ii) the punishee being a wrongdoer and, 
therefore, deserving to be punished (desert). When the two requirements of entitlement and desert 
are met, we say that punishment is legitimate (i.e. a principle of legitimacy holds). 
Since we investigate a finitely repeated VCM with punishment options, a two-stage game 
gets played in every period: at stage 1, players simultaneously choose how much to contribute to the 
public good (contribution stage) and at stage 2 they have access to punishment options (punishment 
stage).  However,  the  principle  of  legitimacy  requires  that  a  single  individual  acts  as  a  ‘high 
contributor’ at stage 1 in order to earn the right to be a punisher at stage 2
8. More specifically, we 
assume that a subject is entitled to punish another subject at stage 2 only if her contribution at stage 
                                                 
 
7 Therefore, our design also differs from recent experimental VCM protocols where norms prescribing who can punish 
and/or who can be punished emerge endogenously within a group (see e.g. Casari and Luini, 2009; Kosfeld et al., 
2009). Casari and Plott (2003) is an example of an experimental paper where, like in the present setup, ‘virtuous’ 
restrictions on punishment are exogenously imposed. Xiao and Houser (2010) assume that when a round is monitored, 
then that round’s lowest contributor will incur a small sanction. However, they assume that punishment is not peer-to-
peer but exogenous, that is under the experimenters’ control. 
8 As far as immediate monetary consequences of subjects’ sanctioning decisions are concerned, it is worth noting that 
while in Casari and Plott (2003) the subjects who find and sanction free riders are monetarily rewarded, in our design 
legitimacy, by allowing cooperators to have access to punishment options, only makes them entitled to costly punish 
wrongdoers.  Xiao  and  Kunreuther  (2010)  compare  deterministic  vs.  stochastic  punishment  in  the  framework  of  a 
prisoner’s dilemma game and, in two out of six treatments, introduce a rule such that, like in the present paper, only 
cooperators are allowed to punish non-cooperators. However, studying the impact of restricted punishment in a two-
player game like the prisoner’s dilemma, where each player always knows who punished whom, significantly differs 
from investigating the effectiveness of legitimacy in a multi-player environment like the VCM.  1 has been higher than the contribution of the peer she wants to punish
9. As a consequence, high 
contributors are (partially) immune from punishment, in the sense that they cannot be sanctioned by 
players who contributed less than them. This rules out antisocial punishment (Herrmann et al., 
2008). Like in a standard, finitely repeated VCM, insofar as all the subjects are supposed to be 
driven  by  material  self-interest  only  and  this  information  is  common  knowledge,  the  unique 
subgame perfect equilibrium is for all agents to never punish and never contribute. 
 
 3.1 Procedure 
A total of 168 subjects participated voluntarily in the experiment at the CEEL Lab of the 
University  of  Trento.  A  total  of  9  sessions  were  conducted,  between  December  2009  and 
November 2010. Six sessions had 20 participants and the other three had 16 participants. The 
experiment was programmed by using the z-tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects, were 
undergraduate students (64.3% from Economics, 49.5 % females, 80.3 % Italian). No individual 
participated in more than one session. In each session, the participants were paid a 5 euro show up 
fee, plus their earnings from the experiment. The average payment per participant was 15.70 euros 
(including the show-up fee) and the sessions averaged approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes. At 
the beginning of each session, participants were welcomed and asked to draw lots, so that they 
were  randomly  assigned  to  terminals.  Once  all  of  them  were  seated,  the  instructions
10  were 
handed to them in written form before being read aloud by the experimenter. We took great care 
to ensure that the participants understood both the rules of the game and the incentives. They had 
to answer several control questions and we did not proceed with the actual experiment until all 
participants had answered all questions correctly. 
In each session, there are 20 periods of interaction that proceed under identical rules. The 
participants in a session were randomly assigned to groups of size four, so that they did not know 
the  identities  of  the  other  members  of  their  group.  Like  other  experimental  studies  (see  e.g. 
Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Denant-Boemont et al., 2007), we used a partner protocol that kept the 
composition of each group constant over rounds, so that, at the end of each period, individuals 
remained in the same group. We did this as repeated interaction is a typical feature of several 
                                                 
9 This implementation of the principle of legitimacy differs from the prevailing form of restricted punishment  
endogenously emerging in Ertan et al. (2008). In their public goods game experiment, subjects vote on whether to allow 
sanctioning of group members whose contributions are (a) below-average, (b) above-average and (c) equal to the 
average: it turns out that eventually the majority of groups opt for prohibiting punishment of higher-than-average 
contributors. Noussair and Tan (2009) investigate whether this ability of a voting process to converge to the optimal 
institutional structure is robust to a specific change in the environment, that is the existence of heterogeneity in the 
value to the group of subjects’ contributions. While their results extend the findings of Ertan et al. (2008), the two 
authors also find that agents fail to converge (through voting) to the efficient punishment regime. 
10 A translation of the instruction sheet is provided in Appendix A. Original instructions were written in Italian. They 
are available upon request from the authors. naturally occurring environments (e.g., businesses or collectives) where punishment occurs (Xiao 
and  Houser,  2010).  However,  individuals’  labels  were  reassigned  on  a  random  basis  in  each 
period. For example, the same player could be designated as player 45 in period t, as player 6 in 
period  t  +  1,  and  as  player  38  in  period  t  +  2.  Therefore,  our  partner  protocol  was  also 
characterized by anonymity of the components of the group and change of participants’ labels 
across rounds
11. The design and the parametric structure of the experiment are based on those of 
Fehr and Gächter (2000). 
 
 3.2. Treatments 
We implemented three experimental treatments: a baseline, unrestricted punishment and full 
information (Baseline) treatment, a restricted punishment with full information (Full R.) treatment 
and a restricted punishment with partial information (Partial R.) treatment.  
There were 3 sessions (20 subjects in two sessions and 16 in the other) for the Baseline, 3 
sessions (with 20 subjects in two sessions and 16 in the other) for the Full R. and 3 sessions (with 
20 subjects in two sessions and 16 in the other) for the Partial R. For each treatment, in each 
session the subjects were divided in groups of N=4 (as in standard VCM experiments) subjects, 
who played a two-stage finitely repeated public goods game with punishment options for T=20 
periods. Participants were aware of the number of rounds they were going to play and of the 
number of stages: information on the following stages allows to evaluate the effect of the threat of 
being punished in stage 2 and on contribution decisions in stage 1. 
Overall,  the  three  treatments  differ  along  two  dimensions  (see  Table  1):  behavioral 
restrictions and feedback about others’ contribution levels in the group. 
 
[TABLE 1 ] 
 
In the Baseline treatment, punishment is unrestricted and subjects are provided with full 
information, that is there is feedback about all their group co-players’ individual contributions. 
This is a replication of the standard VCM with punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), where 
everyone can freely punish everyone else in the group. The other two treatments are both based on 
legitimacy (i.e. entitlement and desert): both in the Full R. and the Partial R. treatment, a subject 
                                                 
11 Although a stranger protocol with random re-matching allows ruling out strategic punishment and reputation motives 
altogether, a partner protocol seems to work as well as a stranger protocol. Nikiforakis (2008), based on Botelho et al. 
(2005),  addresses  this  issue  by  comparing  results  from  a  stranger  protocol  and  a  partner  protocol  and  finds  that 
differences in punishment decisions are not significant (whereas differences in punishment levels are). Fehr and Gächter 
(2000) find differences in outcomes between the partner and the stranger protocol in their VCM experiment. 
 is entitled to sanction another subject in stage 2 only if her contribution at stage 1 has been higher 
than the contribution of the peer she wants to punish. The difference between the two treatments 
regards the feedback that subjects receive at the end of stage 1, in each period: while in Full R. 
subjects are informed about the full vector of others’ contributions (like in the Baseline), in Partial 
R. subjects are informed only about the average contribution level and the specific contribution 
levels  of  their  group  co-players  who  contributed  less  than  them.  Therefore,  no  specific 




 3.2.1. Legitimacy-based treatments 
While our Baseline treatment is based on the standard VCM with punishment options (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000), our two legitimacy-based treatments (Full R. and Partial R.) share the following 
features. In stage 1, at the beginning of each period each participant receives a fixed amount e =20 
of tokens
12. Each participant i has to decide whether she wants to invest into a public project or 
not an amount gi!e. Decisions are made simultaneously and with no information about peers’ 
choices. At the end of stage 1, each participant is informed about her current earnings, which 
consist of two elements:  
 
a.  The amount of her initial 20 tokens that she has kept for herself (i.e. 20 tokens – Her 
Contribution to the project); 
b.  Her income from the project. The income to her is equal to 40% of the total of the four 
individual contributions to the project. 
Therefore, her earnings at the end of stage 1 are calculated by the computer in the following way: 
 
Each participant’s earnings after stage 1 = (20 – her contribution to the project) + 40%*(total 
group               contribution to the project). 
 
                                                 
12 1 token = 0,02 euro. Participants know that they can go on with stage 2 in the experiment only if they contribute more 
than their peers, that is, as we explained above, only if they are entitled to do so
13. Specifically, 
player i will be entitled to sanction player j in stage 2 only if gi >gj. In stage 2, subjects are given the 
opportunity to simultaneously punish those who contributed less than them by assigning a certain 
amount  of  points.  This  implies  that  the  highest  contributor  in  a  group  is  fully  immune  from 
punishment. Potential punishers might decide to assign up to 10 points to each punishee: point 
assignment is costly and costs are charged according to a standard cost function as in Fehr and 




Each point that a subject receives reduces her earnings at stage 1 by 10%.  
Each participant’s earnings at the end of stage 2 are calculated by the computer in the following 
way: 
 
Each participant’s earnings after stage 2 = earnings at the end of stage 1- cost of points she assigned 




4.1. Contribution levels 
  Figure 1 displays the time pattern of individual contributions by period, averaged across 




                                                 
13  It  is  important  to  make  clear  that  we  never  used  loaded  terms  such  as  ‘legitimacy’,  ‘entitlement’,  ‘desert’, 
‘punishment’, ‘free riding’ and ‘immunity’ during the experiment. In all the treatments contribution levels do not decline over time. 
 





Besides this well-known general positive effect of punishment, our data show (Table 3) that, given 
the  same  type  of  restrictions  on  the  punishment  activity,  subjects  who  are  informed  about  the 
contributions of all the other members of their group (Full R. treatment) contribute significantly 
more than subjects who are informed only about the average contribution of their group and on less 
virtuous peers’ contributions (Partial R. treatment) (Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test with group averages 
as observation: z=2.43; p-value: 0.014). At the same time, given the same level of information, 
contributions in the Full R. treatment are on average significantly higher than contributions in the 
baseline  treatment  (z=2.61;  p-value:  0.08).  The  introduction  of  restrictions  on  the  punishment 
activity has a positive effect on the level of contributions. These differences characterize also the 




Result  2.  The  introduction  of  restrictions  increases  the  level  of  cooperation  only  if  detailed 
information on the contribution levels within the group is provided
14. 
 
This result is supported by the regression analysis
15 reported in Table 4, which takes into account 
the  effect  of  a  set  of  control  variables  and  sheds  further  light  on  the  role  of  restrictions  and 
information in shaping the contribution levels. 
 
[TABLE 4 ] 
 
Besides the treatment effect, contributions in each period are positively (and significantly) affected 
by the average contribution in the group in the first period (variable AV_first). Therefore, each 
                                                 
14 The levels of contribution observed in the Partial.R and in the Baseline are not significantly different (Wilcoxon  
Rank-sum Test with: z=-0.046; p-value: 0.96). Note however that a direct comparison between the Baseline and the  
Partial.R treatments is not particularly useful, since Partial.R differs from the Baseline both for the presence of  
restrictions and for the quantity of information provided to the subjects. 
15 All the estimations have been carried out with STATA 11. group’s behavior in the first period represents a key determinant of subsequent contribution choices 
in the group: cooperation seems to be sustained also by idiosyncratic features of the specific group. 
Higher contribution in the Full R. treatment also results in a higher level of efficiency (figure 3). 
Taking group average earnings as independent observations, we observe that average earnings in 
the Full R. treatment are significantly higher than average earnings both in the Baseline (Wilcoxon 






Result  3.  Average  earnings  are  significantly  higher  when  punishment  activity  is  restricted  and 
subjects have information on the contributions of all the other members of their group. 
 
4.2. Punishment behavior 
  As Result 2 shows, the introduction of restrictions in the aim of preventing the assignment 
of punishment points to virtuous subjects results in higher contribution levels. In order to account 
for this evidence we shall give a closer look at the punishment activity in the three treatments and 




With regard to the distribution of punishment points, in all the treatments we observe the typical 
decreasing pattern, which is faster in the Full R. treatment (Figure 4). The difference between the 
average quantity of points assigned in the three treatments is not statistically significant (Table 5) 
(Wilcoxon rank sum Full R. vs Partial R.: z=-1.19; p-value= 0.23; Wilcoxon rank sum Full R. vs 




However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  in  the  Baseline  treatment  a  non-negligible  percentage  of 
punishment points are assigned to virtuous subjects. Table 6 reports the absolute quantities (column 
2) and the percentage (column 3) of punishment points assigned in the Baseline treatment by a 
subject i to a subjects j when the contribution of i is smaller than the contribution of j. We define 
                                                 
16 The result is robust to controls for average contribution in the first period, quantity of assigned points, quantity of  
received point, gender, age, nationality, major and number of past experiments. this type of behavior as “weak antisocial punishment”, as distinguished from “strong antisocial 
punishment”. The latter is observed when i punishes another subject j whose contribution is greater 
than both the contribution of i and the average contribution of the group (columns 4 and 5). In our 
sample 19.5% of the overall punishment activity (number of punishment points assigned in all 
periods) can be classified as weak-antisocial, while 12.2% is strongly antisocial. On average 14.4% 





The presence of a strong form of punishment of virtuous subjects (strong antisocial punishment) in 
the Baseline treatment emerges also in Figure 5, which displays the relation between the distance 
from the average contribution of the group and the average quantity of points received. In the 
Baseline treatment, in some cases strong positive deviations are still punished. This evidence is 
supported by the results of the following regression analysis (results in table 7): 
 
punishment points receivedigt = !0 + !1 pos_dist_ avigt + !2 neg_dist_ avigt  (Eq. 1) 
 
where  pos_dist_  avigt  is  the  positive  distance  from  the  group’s  average  contribution,  i.e.  the 
difference between the subject’s contribution and the group average contribution; this variable is 
equal to zero when the subject’s contribution is below the average. The variable neg_dist_ avigt is 
the  absolute  negative  distance  from  the  average  of  the  groups,  i.e.  the  absolute  value  of  the 
difference between the group’s average contribution and the subject’s contribution; it is equal to 
zero when the subject’s contribution is above the average. 
 
 
[TABLE 7 ] 
 
While in all the treatments the quantity of punishment points received decreases as the negative 
distance from the average increases, positive distance from the average has a significant effect on 
the quantity of points received only in the two treatments with restrictions.  
 
Result 4. When the punishment activity is unrestricted, a non-negligible percentage of points are 
assigned also to subjects who contribute more than the punisher (weak antisocial punishment) and 
in some cases also to the most virtuous subjects (strong antisocial punishment).  
Result 4 is compatible with the higher level of contributions observed in the Full R. treatment, 
where both weak antisocial and strong antisocial punishment are ruled out.  
 
4.3. Determinants of changes in individual contribution levels   
As  we  have  shown  in  the  previous  subsections,  the  three  treatments  are  significantly 
different in terms of contributions levels, but not in terms of punishment points assigned. Hence, an 
analysis of the effects of punishment in altering contribution levels is needed. In particular, we test 
if high contributors and low contributors’ reactions to punishment are different. Having observed 
that a non-negligible share of punishment activity in the treatment without restrictions (Baseline) 
can be classified as antisocial, we shall investigate whether this punishment has also a perverse 
effect  on  the  contribution  level  of  the  most  virtuous  members  of  the  group
17  -  i.e.  whether  it 
weakens their willingness to cooperate. In order to do this, the following equation is estimated for 
each  treatment,  distinguishing  between  subjects  whose  contribution  is  below  the  average 
contribution of the group and subjects whose contribution is not below the average of the group: 
 
contributionigt – contributionigt-1 = !0 + !1 received_punishment igt -1 + !2 dist_avigt-1(Eq. 2) 
 
where received_punishment igt -1 represents the number of punishment points that the subject has 
received  in  the  previous  period,  whereas  dist_avigt-1  is  the  distance  between  the  subject’s 
contribution  and  the  average  contribution  in  the  group  in  the  previous  period.  Results  of  the 
estimation are reported in Table 8, which shows a regression to the mean in all the treatment 
observed also by Denant-Boemont (2007): the higher the distance from the average in the previous 
period, the higher is the absolute increase of the contribution level in the current period.  
 
With  regard  to  the  effect  of  punishment,  we  observe  a  positive  and  significant  effect  on  low 
contributors’ change in levels of contribution in the two treatments with restrictions (Full R. and 
Partial R.). The same effect is not observed for low contributors of the Baseline. Moving to high 
contributors, in the Baseline treatment we observe a negative reaction to punishment. The opposite 
effect  is  observed  in  the  treatment  with  full  information  and  restriction  (Full.R),  while  high 
contributors in the Partial.R do not show any significant change in the level of contribution as a 
consequence of punishment. This evidence confirms the presence of a significant perverse effect of 
antisocial punishment that can explain the low level of contributions observed in the Baseline. The 
                                                 
17 For a detailed analysis of this effect see Ones and Putterman (2007). introduction of restrictions prevents this effect because high contributors know that punishment 




Result  5.  In  all  the  treatments,  regardless  of  the  presence  of  restrictions,  the  increase  in 
contribution levels is stronger the higher the distance from the average in the previous period. 
 
Result 6a. Punishment has a positive effect on low contributors’ willingness to cooperate only in 
the presence of restrictions.  
 
Result 6b. Punishment has a negative effect on high contributors’ willingness to cooperate in the 
Baseline treatment, while it has a positive effect in the case of high contributors in the treatment 
with full information and restrictions. 
 
Finally,  in  the  aim  of  exploring  the  role  of  information  about  others’  behavior  in  shaping 
contribution reactions to punishment, we estimate the following equation for each treatment, by 
considering only the subsample of subjects whose contribution in the previous period was not the 
highest: 
 
contributionigt – contributionigt-1 = !0 + !1 received_punishment igt -1 + !2 dist_avigt-1 + !3 dist_highestigt-1(Eq. 3) 
 
Where dist_highestigt-1 is the distance between subject’s own contribution in period t-1 and the 
highest contribution in the group in period t-1. We run two separate estimations, by distinguishing 
between subjects whose contribution level in the previous period is below the average of the group 
and subjects whose contribution level in the previous period is above the average of the group 
(Table 8). In the case of subjects with contribution levels below the average, information on the 
most virtuous peers does not affect per se the increase in contributions in the Full R. treatment, i.e. 
in the treatment where the full vector of peers’ contribution is available, antisocial punishment is 
ruled out and subjects have the possibility to use virtuous peers’ behavior as a reference point. The 
evidence on the Baseline is particularly interesting. In this case, for subjects who contribute below 
the average, the distance from the virtuous subjects has a significant and negative effect on the 
change in contribution levels: the lower the subject’s contribution at t-1 with respect to the highest 
contribution of her group at t-1, the lower the increase in her contribution moving from t-1 to t. 
These subjects seem to use the information on most virtuous peers to infer the extent at which they can  behave  as  free  riders:  the  more  altruist  their  peers  are,  the  more  profitable  the  choice  of 
behaving as a free-rider. 
With regard to subjects who contribute above the average, in the baseline treatment the 
information about the highest level of contribution in the group does not exert neither a positive nor 
a negative significant effect on the increase in contributions. In the Full R. treatment, the highest 
level of cooperation is taken as a reference point. 
 
[TABLE 9 ] 
 
Result 7. In the full information treatment with restrictions, the highest contribution level in the 
group is used as a reference point only by subjects who contribute above the average of the group. 
In the full information treatment without restrictions, subjects who contribute below the average 
of the group use the information on the most virtuous members to infer the potential gain from 
free riding.   
 
 
4.4. An extension: Average-dependent legitimacy 
  The legitimacy-based treatments (Partial R. and Full R.) described above present a definition 
of legitimacy that is fully exogenous, in the sense that subjects do not decide about the rule that 
classifies them as virtuous or free riders and restricts the possibility of punishment. As already 
emphasized,  the  specific  legitimacy  rule  we  selected,  based  on  peer  comparison,  is  very 
straightforward and formalizes a behavior that emerges spontaneously in the majority of cases. 
However, as a robustness check of the legitimacy principle, we also implement an alternative rule 
that is based on the average level of contribution in the group. Ertan et al. (2008) show that a 
legitimacy rule based on the average might emerge endogenously when subjects vote to allow for 
unrestricted or restricted punishment. In our treatment, also this rule is exogenous: now, it entitles 
subjects  to  punish  peers  only  if  their  own  contribution  has  been  higher  than  the  average 
contribution in the group, and confers immunity to subjects whose contribution has been above 
the average. However, the average level is endogenously determined within the specific group. As 
in the Partial R. treatment, the feedback is limited to the contribution levels of less virtuous peers 
(here, peers who contributed less than the average and that, consequently, can be punished) and to 
the average level of contributions in the group. We ran two sessions of 20 subjects each and a 
total  of  10  groups  and  we  found  no  significant  differences  in  terms  of  contribution  levels, 
punishment behavior and earnings between this treatment and the Partial R. In both treatments, the feedback on more virtuous peers is missing and the average seems to work as an anchor that 
drives subjects’ contributions down.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion  
  In the experimental and theoretical literature on cooperation and punishment, the behavioral 
propensity (i) to cooperate with others at a personal cost and (ii) to punish non-cooperators even 
when it is personally costly in the long run has been termed strong reciprocity (see Gintis, 2008). 
As  Fudenberg  and  Pathak  (2010)  point  out,  understanding  when  and  why  costly  punishment 
actually  facilitates  cooperation  in  public  goods  games  is  important  both  for  the  design  of 
economic institutions and for modelling the evolution of cooperation. Our work contributes to 
shed light on the issue by means of a specially designed public goods game where punishment is 
allowed but only high contributors can punish and only low contributors can be punished. We 
wondered whether our legitimacy-based institution would be conducive to higher cooperation 
levels, compared to the VCM with unrestricted punishment opportunities, despite the lack of 
additional monetary incentives to cooperate. 
Our results confirm that this is the case, providing clear evidence that legitimate punishment 
yields substantial benefits to cooperation
18. Further, it leads to significantly higher earning levels, 
in the aggregate. Therefore, legitimate punishment turns out to be a more successful sanctioning 
institution along both dimensions of efficiency: contribution and earning levels
19. We show that 
an exogenous institution can work extremely well by allowing for peer punishment to occur, but 
at the same time suitably restricting access to it. 
We  claim  that  an  important  implication  to  be  drawn  regards  the  classic  principal-agent 
problem. In the standard analysis of the principal-agent relationship, principals hire agents due to 
the efficiency gains conferred by delegation. However, principal-agent relationships are typically 
characterized by a conflict of interest and asymmetric information. Falk and Kosfeld’s (2006) 
well-known results indicate that there are “hidden costs” of control, as the decision to control 
significantly reduces the agents’ willingness to act in the principal’s interest: explicit incentives 
backfire and performance is lower if the principal controls, compared to if he trusts. As the two 
                                                 
18 Also Ertan et al. (2008) find that an institution based on prohibiting punishment of high contributors is effective in  
raising cooperation levels and earnings. However, unlike the present study, they (1) focus on an  average-based rule (the  
one we considered in the extension illustrated in section 4.4) and (2) investigate the dynamics of its endogenous  
emergence (through voting) when several institutional options are available ex ante. 
19 In light of these results, we view our findings as supportive of evolutionary models based on group selection such as 
Boyd et al. (2003), where the possibility that punishment not only fosters cooperation but also raises group average 
payoffs plays a critical role.   
 
 authors point out, “Elements in the labor contract that can be perceived as signals of distrust and 
control,  such  as  minimum  performance  requirements,  may  harm  more  than  help.  Similarly, 
characteristics  of  the  workplace  environment  that  limit  freedom  of  choice  and  signal  low 
expectations,  such  as  high  levels  of  monitoring  and  surveillance,  may  be  equally 
counterproductive” (p. 1612). Further, the free riding problem which characterizes public good 
provision and team working (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) emerges. Therefore, it is natural to ask 
the following question: what monitoring and incentive schemes can be designed in order to enable 
the advantages of delegation to be realized? We argue that legitimate punishment provides a 
satisfactory answer, as it represents an enforcement device which is at the same time decentralized 
– because the enforcement of cooperation is delegated to the members of the group –, legitimate – 
because a member of a group can punish another member only if her contribution is higher than 
the contribution of the member she wants to punish –, and efficient – because it leads to higher 
levels of cooperation and earnings. 
On the whole, our three-treatment design reveals that it is the interaction between behavioral 
restrictions and amount of information that crucially affects aggregate cooperation levels and 
earnings. The significant difference between contribution levels in the Full R. and the Partial R. 
treatment  (Result  2)  indicates  that  providing  subjects  with  explicit  information  about  higher 
contributors’ choices, that is ‘virtuous’ subjects’ behavior, plays a key role in the enforcement of 
cooperation. In this regard, it is natural to refer to an interesting series of recent experimental 
articles investigating the role of ‘leadership’ in social dilemma games and finding that leadership 
significantly  raises  average  contribution  levels.  In  these  studies,  leadership  is  typically 
implemented  by  letting  an  appointed  leader  influence  others  ‘by  example’:  she  decides  and 
announces  her  contribution  before  the  other  group  members  (simultaneously)  make  their 
contribution decisions (Van der Heijden and Moxnes, 2003; Gächter and Renner, 2004; Güth et 
al., 2007). In contrast, in our work we impose all subjects’ contribution and sanctioning decisions 
to occur simultaneously in every period. Further, higher contributors’ choices are never made 
salient  throughout  the  experiment.  However,  the  significant  difference  in  contribution  levels 
observed  between  our  Full  R.  and  Partial  R.  treatment  suggests  the  following  interpretation: 
subjects  behave  as  if  they  perceived  the  legitimacy  principle  as  endogenously  conferring  a 
leadership  to  high  contributors,  by  making  them  (and  only  them)  entitled  to  sanction  lower 
contributors and (at least partially) immune from sanctioning. Under full information, this form of 
endogenous leadership (through legitimacy) leads to a significant increase in average contribution levels,  in  line  with  the  aforementioned  leadership  papers
20.  An  even  more  specific  analogy 
connects  our  paper  to  Güth  et  al.’s  (2007)  experiment,  where,  in  one  of  the  implemented 
treatments,  they  suppose  that  full  information  holds  and  leaders  can  punish  others  through 
exclusion, i.e. veto power. Interestingly, it is right in this case of an ‘empowered leader’ – the 
closest to our Full R. treatment – that they obtain the strongest result in terms of contribution 
levels, also compared to cooperation rates observed under pure leadership by example
21. 
Antisocial  punishment  is  documented  to  play  a  relevant  role  when  available:  if  the 
punishment activity is unrestricted, a non-negligible percentage of points are assigned also to 
subjects who contribute more than the punisher (weak antisocial punishment) and in some cases 
also to the most virtuous subjects (strong antisocial punishment). Under unrestricted sanctioning, 
the possibility that antisocial punishment occurs may also generate a ‘motivational crowding-out’ 
effect on virtuous subjects, as knowing that a significant probability to be punished exists even for 
high contributors may weaken their willingness to cooperate. By contrast, insofar as punishment 
is legitimate, this effect can be ruled out. More generally, a critical condition for a punishment 
institution to be successful is that “the incentives provided by punishment do not crowd out pre-
existing social preferences that might have induced contributions in the absence of punishment, as 
is  observed  in  a  large  number  of  public  goods  and  principal  agent  experiments  surveyed  in 
Bowles  (2008)  and  Bowles  and  Hwang  (2008).  The  counterproductive  effects  of  explicit 
incentives in the experiments they survey appear to arise when the punishment or fines fail to 
evoke shame in the shirker, but rather convey negative information about the individual imposing 
the incentive” (Carpenter et al., 2009). Our experimental result regarding the effectiveness of 
legitimate  punishment    suggests  that,  unlike  under  unrestricted  punishment,  the  incentives 
provided by an institution based on legitimate punishment do not appear to crowd out pre-existing 
social preferences. 
In general, the increase in contribution levels is stronger the higher the distance from the 
average. Information about the highest contributors affects the change in the levels of contribution 
of  the  most  virtuous  subject  in  the  full  information  treatment  with  restrictions.  In  the  full 
information  treatment  without  restrictions,  the  information  about  the  highest  contributors  is 
(opportunistically) interpreted by the less virtuous subjects as the assurance that someone else is 
                                                 
20 As to empirical work, the effects of ‘leading by example’ have been analyzed with regard to charitable fundraising: 
a well-known result from these studies is that if renowned philanthropists donate to a specific project and this is 
publicly  announced,  others  often  tend  to  follow  (Vesterlund,  2003).  Further,  so  called  ‘seed  money’  typically 
generates a similar effect. !"#$%&'#()*(#%&#+,-#."/%(%0*1234*5"'#$-*0"6+-7#*#5+0"6)*(#5%0%.*-#"$$"1(#)+.'5#"8"&#
()+,/)#6"#-"$"-#(+#*#5%0,.(*&"+,530+8"9#-*()"-#()*&#*#5":,"&(%*.9#/*0"; 
21 As far as psychological experiments on leadership are concerned, it is interesting to note that several studies 
converge in finding a positive effect on contributions when the leader adheres to the principles of procedural fairness 
(see e.g. De Cremer et al., 2005). 
 carrying the burden of the public project, so that there is no need to do the same. Furthermore, as 
punishment is frequently used ‘unfairly’, all types of subjects in the baseline do not react to 
sanctions by enhancing their cooperative behavior in the next period. 
The experiment run by Ertan et al. (2009) shows that people are willing to vote for an 
institution based on legitimate punishment. Our work can be seen as complementary to theirs, as 
the central question of our paper can be also expressed as follows: once subjects agree on a given 
legitimacy-based punishment institution, for the voluntary provision of a public good, does this 
institution work, with regard to both the achievement and sustainability of high cooperation and 
earning levels? How does it fare compared to its ‘natural benchmark’, that is an institution based 
on unrestricted punishment? Our experiment provides evidence that legitimate punishment can be 
an  effective  institution  in  deterring  misconduct.  Legitimate  punishment  is  an  ubiquitous 
phenomenon in several domains of real life, from access to positions in courts and police to 
family and intraorganizational relationships, education and political realms. Yet, so far there was 
no  experimental  evidence  concerning  the  effects  of  exogenously  determined  legitimacy-based 
sanctioning institutions and feedback on cooperation.  
Our  study  also  leaves  interesting  avenues  for  further  research,  including  the  relative 
effectiveness of other legitimacy-based enforcement devices (e.g. based on positive incentives to 
cooperate, such as legitimate rewarding), the robustness of our major findings across alternative 
designs  (e.g.  ultimatum  games,  allowing  for  rejection  only  to  responders  who  receive  unfair 
offers)  as  well  as  the  performance  of  the  investigated  mechanism  across  different  cultural 
contexts. In this regard, we speculatively argue that legitimate punishment institutions might turn 
out to be even more effective within less developed societies than within industrialized ones, as 
recent  research  on  cross-cultural  differences  (Herrmann  et  al.,  2008;  Gächter  and  Herrmann, 
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Figure 1. Average contributions 





























Table 1. Treatments     
       
    Restrictions 
    Yes  No 
 
Full 
Full.R  Baseline 
Information 
(3 sessions; 
14 groups;  
56 subjects) 
(3 sessions; 
14 groups; 56 
subjects) 
Partial 
Partial.R    
 
(3 sessions; 








Table 2. Cost function 
Points  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Cost  0  1  2  4  6  9  12  16  20  25  30 





Figure  5. Average  quantity  of  points  received  as  a  function  of 
the distance from the average of the group  
  
 
Table 3. Mean contribution     
       
Group  Baseline  Partial.R  Full.R 
1  13.76  16.06  18.69 
   (7.34)  (3.26)  (3.40) 
2  18.40  4.05  10.76 
   (3.31)  (3.75)  (2.19) 
3  4.94  3.43  16.90 
   (1.32)  (1.59)  (2.38) 
4  11.30  5.44  0.81 
   (4.03)  (0.85)  (0.33) 
5  12.85  1.74  18.34 
   (4.04)  (2.21)  (1.67) 
6  4.58  9.59  17.70 
   (2.95)  (1.85)  (3.51) 
7  6.46  19.20  5.69 
   (0.85)  (2.20)  (3.54) 
8  2.18  3.70  18.91 
   (0.72)  (2.79)  (2.68) 
9  4.39  14.50  16.85 
   (2.37)  (2.03)  (3.42) 
10  1.64  3.10  18.95 
   (0.94)  (1.01)  (2.28) 
11  2.84  15.06  13.73 
   (2.11)  (5.37)  (4.63) 
12  15.13  9.53  14.38 
   (4.77)  (1.97)  (3.24) 
13  7.05  8.63  13.56 
   (1.63)  (3.39)  (1.96) 
14  11.11  3.89  18.09 
   (2.95)  (1.17)  (2.29) 
Mean  8.42  8.33  14.53 
       














Table 4. Determinants of contribution 
 
Contribution  Random Effect Tobit 
     
Partial.R  -5.18 *** 
  (1.60) 
   
Baseline  -4.94*** 
  (1.70) 
   
Av_First   1.17*** 
  (0.24) 
   
Constant  -6.00 
   (6.22) 
Log-likelihood  -7677.25 
Chi(2)  95.87 
N. of obs.  3360 
   
The dependent variable takes values from 0 to 20. Av_first: group average 
contribution in the first period. Baseline: dummy variable taking value 1 if 
the treatment is the baseline treatment;Partial.R dummy variable taking 
value 1 if the treatment is the baseline Partial.R treatment;  
Controls: age, nationality, major, gender and number of experiments in 
which the subject has been involved in the past. 
   



















Table 5. Average point given per period   
       
Group  Baseline  Partial. R.  Full.R 
1  0.39  0.93  0.31 
   (0.59)  (1.05)  (0.83) 
2  0.53  0.78  0.93 
   (1.04)  (0.52)  (0.78) 
3  0.03  0.25  0.48 
   (0.08)  (0.43)  (0.57) 
4  0.56  0.54  0.26 
   (0.53)  (0.53)  (0.27) 
5  0.75  0.85  0.58 
   (0.89)  (0.82)  (0.73) 
6  0.90  1.06  0.79 
   (1.05)  (1.33)  (2.10) 
7  0.31  0.18  0.48 
   (0.62)  (0.46)  (1.29) 
8  0.56  0.98  0.31 
   (0.45)  (1.06)  (0.76) 
9  1.66  1.20  0.60 
   (1.10)  (0.85)  (0.67) 
10  2.26  0.83  0.55 
   (0.81)  (0.49)  (0.93) 
11  1.65  0.53  0.60 
   (1.04)  (0.51)  (0.39) 
12  0.19  0.69  1.18 
   (0.25)  (0.63)  (0.75) 
13  1.63  1.53  1.06 
   (0.77)  (0.78)  (0.77) 
14  1.54  0.53  0.34 
   (0.37)  (0.47)  (0.36) 
Mean  0.77  0.93  0.60 
       
Standard deviations in parentheses   
  
Table 6. Antisocial punishment (A.P.) in the Baseline    
           
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Points given   Weak A.P    Strong A.P.   
Group 






1  29  5  17.2%  5  17.2% 
2  42  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
3  2  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
4  45  12  26.7%  8  17.8% 
5  59  10  16.9%  3  5.1% 
6  72  29  40.3%  16  22.2% 
7  25  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
8  45  2  4.4%  1  2.2% 
9  133  5  3.8%  3  2.3% 
10  181  48  26.5%  36  19.9% 
11  132  18  13.6%  7  5.3% 
12  15  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
13  130  66  50.8%  41  31.5% 
14  123  7  5.7%  6  4.9% 
Total  1033  202 (19.5%)    126 (12.2 %)   
Mean  73.79  14.43  14.71%  9.00  9.17% 
  
 
Table 7: Determinants of the quantity of punishment points received 
       
Received points  Baseline  Partial.R  Full.R 
           
Positive distance from average  0.04  -0.78 ***  -0.97*** 
  (0.047)  (0.11)  (0.16) 
Absolute negative distance from average  0.91***   0.61 ***  0.64*** 
  (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.03) 
Constant 
-0.60  -3.43*  -1.25 
   (2.61)  (1.83*)  (1.93) 
Log-likelihood  -1154.05  -1128.12  -874.83 
Wald Chi(2)  397.69  332.10   389.15 
N. Of obs.  1120  1120  1120 
       
Random Effect Tobit. 
The dependent variable takes values from 0 to 30.  
Positive distance from average is the difference between subject’s contribution and the average contribution of the group; it 
takes value equal to zero when the subject contributes less than the average. Absolute negative distance from average is the 
difference between average contribution of the group  and subject’s contribution; it takes value equal to zero when the subject 
contributes more than the average. Controls: age, nationality, major, gender and number of experiments in which the subject 
has been involved in the past. 
Standard errors in parentheses       
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.     
  
 
Table 8.Determinants of the change in contribution levels 
 
  Below the average in t-1  Not below the average in t-1 
Contribution at t - contribution at t-1  Baseline  Partial.R  Full.R  Baseline  Partial.R  Full.R 
                    
Distance from average at t-1  -0.60***  -0.50***  -0.78***  -0.78***  -0.64***  -0.42*** 
  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
             
Points received at t-1  0.10  0.50***  0.60***   -0.86***   -0.02   0.85** 
  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.30)  (0.44) 
             
Constant  1.70  -0.11  -3.81  -1.46  3.13  -0.90 
   (2.77)  (3.33)  (3.00)  (2.15)  (2.33)  (1.92) 
Log-likelihood  -1165.19  -1194.05  -931.65  -1490.15  -1550.95  -1929.30 
Wald Chi(2)  82.57  151.54  190.99  201.26  103.62  52.85 
N. Of obs.  468  456  329  596  608  735 
 
 
The dependent variable takesvalues from -20 to 20.  
Distance from average at t-1 is the difference between subject’s contribution at t-1 and the average contribution of the group at t-1. 
Controls: gender, age, nationality, Controls: age, nationality, major, gender and number of experiments in which the subject has been involved in 
the past. 
Standard errors in parentheses 



























Table 9.Impact of information about highest contributions in the group. 
  Below the average in t-1  Not below the average in t-1 
Contribution at t - contribution at 
t-1  Baseline  Full.R  Baseline  Full.R 
              
Distance from average at t-1  -0.83***  -0.66***  -0.52***  -1.63*** 
  (0.15)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.17) 
Distance from the highest 
contribution at t-1  -0.12**  0.08  -0.06  0.26** 
  (0.064)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.12) 
         
Points received at t-1  0.08  0.59***  -0.51  0.09 
  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.33)  (0.42) 
         
Constant  1.77  -3.63  5.64  8.81 
   (2.45)  (2.98)  (3.27)  (3.03) 
Log-likelihood  -1163.29  -931.33  -367.37  -306.41 
Wald Chi(2)  87.93  191.74  22.18  109.38 
N. Of obs.  468  329  152  127 
The estimation is limited to the sub-sample of subjects whose contribution in the previous period was not the highest of the 
group. The dependent variable takes values from -20 to 20.  
Distance from average at t-1 is the difference between subject’s contribution at t-1 and the average contribution of the group at 
t-1. 
Distance from highest at t-1 is the absolute difference between subject’s contribution at t-1 and the highest contribution of the 
group at t-1. 
Controls: age, nationality, major, gender and number of experiments in which the subject has been involved in the past. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 